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Synopsis
In this piece, I delve into some thoughts I’ve had about decision theory. These
have been inspired by the vaccine rollout phase of the COVID-19 Pandemic. I
focus on decision making under uncertainty, as it relates to the decision to get
vaccinated or not.
COVID-19, in addition to being a deadly pandemic, has also been a seminar
on the significance of mathematics for understanding real-world events. As
experts have tried to understand, and help the rest of us understand, what’s
been going on, mathematical modeling, exponential growth, probability theory, Bayes theorem, and a host of other topics have gotten their due.
As I write these lines, about 63% of the U.S. population is fully vaccinated
against COVID-19 (COVID) [6]. The U.S. is also in the midst of a recent
surge in COVID cases which has apparently been caused by the highly transmissible Omicron variant of the virus. Since entering office, President Biden
has pleaded with Americans who’re not yet vaccinated to get a shot (or two,
as the case may be) [5]. Yet many people are very reluctant to get vaccinated.
There’s evidence that some of this reluctance is due to partisanship, with a
higher proportion of Republicans than Democrats saying they don’t plan to
get vaccinated [4]. But partisanship probably doesn’t explain all of it. That’s
because there’s also evidence that vaccine hesitancy is due to concerns about
their safety. That is, some appear to believe that vaccines against COVID
may prevent the worst of COVID by creating health problems of their own
[4]. Apparently, these folks would rather take their chances with COVID,
in a “devil you know” sort of way. As I’ve considered all this, I’ve thought
about another area of mathematics which is relevant to the COVID mess:
decision theory.
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Decision theory is an area of study which focuses on how agents (natural
agents like people or artificial ones like computers) do or should make decisions. The centering of how agents do make decisions is called “descriptive
decision theory,” while the focus on how they should make them is referred to
as “normative decision theory.” Another distinction decision theorists make
is between decisions made under certainty versus those under uncertainty [1].
A decision under certainty is one where the agent knows for sure the outcome
of a given act. A person trying to decide whether to buy an ice cream cone
might reasonably be modeled as facing a decision under certainty, assuming
it makes sense to think that such a person knows for sure that handing money
over to the cashier will definitely result in an ice cream cone being given to
them.
A decision under uncertainty is where the agent doesn’t know for sure the
outcome of a given act. This is the situation those deciding whether to get
vaccinated against COVID are facing.
To get a bit more precise, in order to model a decision under uncertainty,
the modeler needs to do at least four things: 1) specify who the agent is
or agents are 2) specify the possible acts the agent/agents may choose to
engage in, 3) specify the possible states of the world (that is, the uncertain
outcomes which may occur) and 4) specify the payoffs to the agent/agents
under all possible combinations of acts and states. When it comes to many
models of uncertainty, a fifth thing is done: probabilities are associated with
the possible states of the world. One of the most common ways of presenting
models in decision theory is through the use of tables [1].
In Table 1 below, I provide an example of all this by modeling the decision
facing those trying to decide whether to get vaccinated, the agents in the
model. The possible acts are 1) get vaccinated or 2) don’t get vaccinated.
The possible states of the world are 1) contract COVID or 2) don’t contract
COVID. The payoffs from the combinations of possible acts and states are
in the cells of the table and, hopefully, self-explanatory. All of the statistics
that we’ve kept on COVID, vaccine efficacy and effectiveness, etc. notwithstanding, I suspect that many people find it difficult to assign probabilities
to the possible payoffs in the table. That is, I suspect that many are deciding
whether to get vaccinated, or not, without appealing to precise numbers representing their beliefs about the probabilities of contracting COVID, suffering
some adverse health effect as a result of getting vaccinated, etc.
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Get Vaccinated

Don’t Get Vaccinated

Contract COVID
Likely mild or asymptomatic COVID infection, unlikely to be hospitalized or die from it,
possible bad health effects of vaccine (a)
Perhaps mild or asymptomatic COVID infection but more likely
to be moderate or severe and more likely to
be hospitalized or die
from it, no possible bad
health effects from vaccine (c)

Don’t Contract COVID
Possible bad health effects resulting from vaccine (b)

No possible bad health
effects resulting from
vaccine (d)

Table 1: A Decision Model for Getting Vaccinated. The letters in parentheses will be used
below to refer to cell payoffs.

When trying to model decisions under uncertainty where agents may find it
difficult to assign probabilities to various outcomes, decision theorists have
come up with a number of ways of representing how agents might, or should,
make decisions in such situations.
First, these theorists make assumptions about agents’ preferences. Given the
table above, for example, we might assume that agents prefer payoff (d) to
(b), (b) to (a), and (a) to (c). That is, (d) > (b) > (a) > (c), where “>”
stands for “is preferred to.” Even if you don’t agree with this preference
ranking, assume it for the sake of illustration.
One of the concepts decision theorists use to represent how people might or
should make decisions is the “maximin criterion” [1]. This criterion says that
a decision maker chooses, or should choose, the act that generates the largest
possible minimum payoff. Let’s see how maximin applies in this case.
First, focus on the “get vaccinated” row. Since payoff (b) is preferred to
payoff (a), (a) is the minimum possible payoff for someone who chooses to get
vaccinated. Next, consider the “don’t get vaccinated” row. We see from the
preference ranking, (d) > (b) > (a) > (c), that payoff (d) is preferred to (c)
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(I’m assuming transitivity of preferences, a common assumption in decision
theory). So, (c) is the minimum possible payoff for someone who chooses not
to get vaccinated.
Now compare payoffs (a) and (c); since (a) is preferred to (c), (a) is the one
which meets the maximin criterion. That is, payoff (a) is the largest possible
minimum one.
Those of us who’ve chosen to get vaccinated may, at least implicitly, have
appealed to maximin in order to make our decisions. How might decision
theory capture the decisions of those who’ve chosen not to get vaccinated?
One possibility is the “maximax criterion” which says that agents should or
do chose the act which generates the largest possible maximum payoff [1].
Looking back at our table, payoff (b) is preferred to (a) and (d) is preferred
to (c). So, the maximum payoff of getting vaccinated is (b) and of not getting
vaccinated is (d). And since payoff (d) is preferred to (b), the largest possible
maximum is payoff is (d). That is, the act which meets the maximax criterion
is the choice not to get vaccinated.
One thing I should point out is that, so far, I’ve assumed that decision makers
care only about payoffs to themselves. Obviously, the choice to get vaccinated
or not doesn’t just affect the person making the choice but impacts others
who might come into contact with them as well; that’s what the concept
of “herd immunity” is all about. To the extent that my model is meant to
represent choices people are actually making and the extent to which people
in the real world consider the effects of their vaccine choice on others, this is
a serious limitation of the model.
I said earlier that decision theory is partly normative and, therefore, addresses
how agents, when faced with uncertainty, should make decisions. Neither
maximin, maximax, nor any other decision-making criterion in situations
such as this one has received unanimous consent among decision theorists.
That is, as far as decision theory is concerned and assuming my model closely
approximates the decision situation agents are currently facing, it isn’t clear
that those who’ve decided not to get vaccinated are behaving irrationally.
Part of the decision situation agents are currently facing has to do with
incentives for getting vaccinated. Such incentives affect the payoffs agents
receive from different combinations of acts and states of the world.
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When COVID vaccines were first being rolled out, not many institutions
required people to get vaccinated. That has changed as some employers, colleges, and universities are requiring vaccines or boosters. How might vaccine
mandates change the decision situation people would face?
Take a look at Table 2 below:
Get Vaccinated

Don’t Get Vaccinated

Contract COVID
Likely mild or asymptomatic COVID infection, unlikely to be hospitalized or die from it,
possible bad health effects of vaccine, avoid
loss of job or opportunity to attend college
(a)
Perhaps mild or asymptomatic COVID infection but more likely
to be moderate or severe and more likely to
be hospitalized or die
from it, no possible bad
health effects from vaccine, loss of job or opportunity to attend college (c)

Don’t Contract COVID
Possible bad health effects resulting from vaccine, avoid loss of job
or opportunity to attend college (b)

No possible bad health
effects resulting from
vaccine, loss of job or
opportunity to attend
college (d)

Table 2: A Decision Model for Getting Vaccinated When There Is A Vaccine Requirement.
The letters in parentheses will be used below to refer to cell payoffs.

This is similar to Table 1 from earlier but differs by including the possibility,
should one refuse to get vaccinated, of losing a job or the opportunity to
attend college. That is, I’ve assumed that all public and private sector employers, as well as all colleges, have required people to get vaccinated; those
who didn’t get immunized wouldn’t be allowed to work in the formal economy
or attend college. How might such requirements affect people’s vaccination
decision?
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Presumably, the hope of those advocating vaccine mandates is that the following preference ordering is the one decision makers would be acting on:
(b) > (a) > (d) > (c). This would mean that if one chose vaccination,
(b) > (a), and if they chose non-vaccination, (d) > (c). Since (a) > (c),
those deciding on the basis of the maximin criterion would choose to get vaccinated. Given that (b) > (d), people deciding on the basis of the maximax
criterion would also choose vaccination. That’s because such folks, in a world
where they didn’t end up with COVID, would rather face the possible negative health consequences of a vaccine but keep their jobs or the opportunity
to go to college, than avoid such health consequences but lose the chance at
a college education or livelihood.
Whether a wave of vaccination mandates will ripple across the country remains to be seen. If so, as someone interested in decision theory, I’ll be
watching closely.
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